Which United States Supreme Court Case Established the Power of Judicial Review?

1803 U.S. Supreme Courtroom instance

1803 United States Supreme Court case

Marbury 5. Madison
Supreme Courtroom of the U.s.a.
Argued February 11, 1803 Decided February 24, 1803
Total instance name	William Marbury v. James Madison, Secretary of State of the Us
Citations	5 U.S. 137 (more) i Cranch 137; two L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.South. LEXIS 352
Decision	Opinion
Case history
Prior	Original action filed in U.S. Supreme Court; club to show cause why writ of mandamus should not issue, Dec 1801
Property
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is unconstitutional to the extent it purports to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond that permitted by the Constitution. Congress cannot pass laws that are contrary to the Constitution, and it is the office of the judiciary to interpret what the Constitution permits.
Court membership
Primary Justice John Marshall Associate Justices William Cushing· William Paterson Samuel Chase· Bushrod Washington Alfred Moore
Case opinion
Majority	Marshall, joined by Paterson, Chase, Washington
Cushing and Moore took no office in the consideration or determination of the case.
Laws practical
U.S. Const. arts. I, Three; Judiciary Act of 1789 § thirteen

Marbury five. Madison , v U.Due south. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.Due south. Supreme Court instance that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they discover to violate the Constitution of the United States. Decided in 1803, Marbury is regarded every bit the single most important decision in American constitutional law.^[i] The Court'due south landmark conclusion established that the U.Due south. Constitution is bodily law, not just a statement of political principles and ideals, and helped ascertain the boundary betwixt the constitutionally dissever executive and judicial branches of the federal authorities.

The example originated in early 1801 every bit function of the political and ideological rivalry between approachable President John Adams and incoming President Thomas Jefferson.^[two] Adams had lost the U.Due south. presidential election of 1800 to Jefferson, and in March 1801, just two days before his term every bit president concluded, Adams appointed several dozen Federalist Political party supporters to new circuit judge and justice of the peace positions in an attempt to frustrate Jefferson and his supporters in the Democratic-Republican Party.^[3] The U.S. Senate quickly confirmed Adams's appointments, just upon Adams' departure and Jefferson's inauguration a few of the new judges' commissions still had non been delivered.^[3] Jefferson believed the undelivered commissions were void and instructed his Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver them.^[4] I of the undelivered commissions belonged to William Marbury, a Maryland businessman who had been a stiff supporter of Adams and the Federalists. In late 1801, after Madison had repeatedly refused to deliver his committee, Marbury filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Courtroom asking the Court to issue a writ of mandamus forcing Madison to deliver his commission.^[five]

In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held firstly that Madison'southward refusal to evangelize Marbury's commission was illegal, and secondly that information technology was normally proper for a court in such situations to gild the government official in question to deliver the commission.^[half-dozen] But in Marbury's instance, the Court did non order Madison to comply. Examining the department of the police force Congress had passed that gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over types of cases like Marbury's, the Court establish that information technology had expanded the definition of its jurisdiction across what was originally set forth in the U.S. Constitution.^[7] The Court then struck down that section of the law, announcing that American courts accept the ability to invalidate laws that they notice to violate the Constitution.^[viii] Considering this meant the Courtroom had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not upshot the writ that Marbury had requested.

Groundwork

President John Adams, who appointed Marbury but before his presidential term ended.

Thomas Jefferson, who succeeded Adams and believed Marbury'south undelivered commission was void.

James Madison, Jefferson's Secretarial assistant of State, who withheld Marbury's commission.

In the fiercely contested U.S. presidential election of 1800, the three main candidates were Thomas Jefferson, Aaron Burr, and the incumbent President John Adams.^[i] Adams espoused the pro-concern and pro-national-government politics of the Federalist Party and its leader Alexander Hamilton, while Jefferson and Burr were function of the opposing Autonomous-Republican Party, which favored agronomics and decentralization. American public opinion had gradually turned confronting the Federalists in the months leading up to the election, mainly due to their apply of the controversial Alien and Sedition Acts, also every bit growing tensions with United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland, with whom the Federalists favored close ties.^[9] Jefferson easily won the popular vote merely only narrowly defeated Adams in the Electoral Higher.

As the results of the ballot became clear, Adams and the Federalists became determined to practise their remaining influence before Jefferson took office and did everything they could to fill federal offices with "anti-Jeffersonians" who were loyal to the Federalists.^{[2] [10]} On March 2, 1801, but ii days before his presidential term ended,^{[note 1]} Adams nominated about 60 Federalist supporters to new circuit judge and justice of the peace positions the Federalist-controlled Congress had recently created. These last-infinitesimal nominees—whom Jefferson's supporters derisively called the "Midnight Judges"—included William Marbury, a prosperous businessman from Maryland.^[11] An ardent Federalist, Marbury was agile in Maryland politics and had been a vigorous supporter of the Adams presidency.^[12]

The post-obit twenty-four hour period, March 3, the Senate approved Adams's nominations en masse. The appointees' commissions were immediately written out, and then signed by Adams and sealed by Secretary of State John Marshall, who had been named the new Master Justice of the Supreme Courtroom in January but continued also serving equally secretary of state for the residue of Adams' term.^{[10] [13]} Marshall so dispatched his younger brother James Markham Marshall to deliver the commissions to the appointees.^[5] With just one day left before Jefferson'south inauguration, James Marshall was able to evangelize most of the commissions, but a few—including Marbury'south—were not delivered.^[10]

The twenty-four hour period subsequently, March 4, 1801, Jefferson was sworn in and became the third President of the United States. Jefferson instructed his new Secretary of State, James Madison, to withhold the undelivered commissions.^[10] In Jefferson's opinion, the commissions were void because they had not been delivered before Adams left role.^[iv] Without the commissions, the appointees were unable to assume the offices and duties to which they had been appointed.

Over the next several months, Madison continually refused to deliver Marbury's committee to him. Finally, in Dec 1801, Marbury filed a lawsuit against Madison in the U.Southward. Supreme Courtroom, asking the Court to force Madison to evangelize his commission.^[10] This lawsuit resulted in the case of Marbury v. Madison.

Decision

On Feb 24, 1803,^{[note 2]} the Supreme Court issued a unanimous iv–0 determination^{[notation 3]} against Marbury. The Courtroom's stance was written by Master Justice John Marshall, who structured the Court'southward stance around a series of three questions it answered in turn:

• Offset, did Marbury accept a right to his committee?
• Second, if Marbury had a right to his committee, was there a legal remedy for him to obtain it?
• 3rd, if there was such a remedy, could the Supreme Courtroom legally outcome it?^[fourteen]

Marbury's right to his committee

The Court began by determining that Marbury had a legal right to his commission. Marshall reasoned that all advisable procedures were followed: the commission had been properly signed and sealed.^[15] Madison had argued that the commissions were void if not delivered, merely the Courtroom disagreed, saying that the delivery of the commission was simply a custom, not an essential element of the commission itself.^[6]

The [President's] signature is a warrant for affixing the neat seal to the committee, and the slap-up seal is but to be affixed to an musical instrument which is complete. ... The transmission of the commission is a do directed by convenience, but not past law. It cannot therefore be necessary to constitute the engagement, which must precede it and which is the mere human action of the President.

— Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 158, 160.

The Court said that because Marbury's commission was valid, Madison'due south withholding it was "violative of a vested legal right" on Marbury'southward part.^[16]

Marbury'southward legal remedy

Turning to the second question, the Court said that the police provided Marbury a remedy for Madison's unlawful withholding of his commission from him. Marshall wrote that "it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal correct, there is also a legal remedy past suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." This dominion derives from the aboriginal Roman legal maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium ("where there is a legal right, there is a legal remedy"), which was well established in the early Anglo-American common law.^{[17] [18]} In what the American legal scholar Akhil Amar called "1 of the most important and inspiring passages" of the opinion,^[19] Marshall wrote:

The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every private to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury.

— Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.

The Court then confirmed that a writ of mandamus—a type of court order that commands a regime official to perform an act their official duties legally crave them to perform—was the proper remedy for Marbury's state of affairs.^[twenty] Simply this raised the outcome of whether the Court, which was office of the judicial co-operative of the authorities, had the power to command Madison, who as secretary of state was part of the executive branch of the government.^[14] The Court held that so long as the remedy involved a mandatory duty to a specific person, and not a political matter left to discretion, the courts could provide the legal remedy.^[21] Borrowing a phrase John Adams had drafted in 1779 for the Massachusetts State Constitution, Marshall wrote: "The government of the Us has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."^[22]

The Supreme Courtroom's jurisdiction

This brought Marshall to the third question: did the Supreme Court have proper jurisdiction over the instance that would allow it to result the writ of mandamus?^[24] The answer depended entirely on how the Court interpreted the text of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Congress had passed the Judiciary Act to establish the American federal court system, since the U.S. Constitution merely mandates a Supreme Court and leaves the rest of the U.S. federal judicial power to reside in "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to fourth dimension ordain and establish."^[25] Section 13 of the Judiciary Act sets out the Supreme Courtroom'due south original and appellate jurisdictions.

And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Courtroom shall have exclusive [original] jurisdiction over all cases of a civil nature where a land is a party ... And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings confronting ambassadors, or other public ministers ... The Supreme Courtroom shall likewise have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for; and shall accept power to issue ... writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons belongings office, under the authority of the U.s.a..

—Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 13 (accent added)

Marbury had argued that the linguistic communication of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court the authority to issue writs of mandamus when hearing cases under original jurisdiction, not only appellate jurisdiction.^[24] Equally Marshall explains in the stance, original jurisdiction gives a court the power to be the first to hear and decide a instance; appellate jurisdiction gives a courtroom the power to hear an appeal from a lower court's decision and to "revise and correct" the previous decision.^[8] Although the linguistic communication on the power to issue writs of mandamus appears after Section thirteen'southward sentence on appellate jurisdiction, rather than with the earlier sentences on original jurisdiction, a semicolon separates it from the clause on appellate jurisdiction. The department does not brand articulate whether the mandamus clause was intended to be read every bit part of the appellate clause or on its own—in the stance, Marshall quoted merely the end of the department^[26]—and the police'south wording can plausibly be read either way.^[27] In the end, the Court agreed with Marbury and interpreted section 13 of the Judiciary Act to take authorized the Court to exercise original jurisdiction over cases involving disputes over writs of mandamus.^{[28] [29]}

But as Marshall pointed out, this meant that the Judiciary Act contradicted Commodity Iii of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes the judicial co-operative of the U.S. government. Article Iii defines the Supreme Court's jurisdiction as follows:

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a Land shall exist Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases earlier mentioned, the supreme Court shall accept appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

—U.Due south. Constitution, Article III, Department ii (accent added).

Article 3 says that the Supreme Court just has original jurisdiction over cases where a U.S. state is a political party to a lawsuit or where a lawsuit involves foreign dignitaries. Neither of these categories covered Marbury'southward lawsuit, which was a dispute over a writ of mandamus for his justice of the peace commission. So, according to the Constitution, the Court did not have original jurisdiction over a case like Marbury's.^{[8] [28]}

But the Court had interpreted the Judiciary Act to accept given information technology original jurisdiction over lawsuits for writs of mandamus. This meant that the Judiciary Act had taken the Constitution'southward initial telescopic for the Supreme Courtroom'southward original jurisdiction, which did not cover cases involving writs of mandamus, and expanded it to include them. The Court ruled that Congress cannot increase the Supreme Courtroom's original jurisdiction as it was set down in the Constitution, and it therefore held that the relevant portion of Department 13 of the Judiciary Human activity violated Article Three of the Constitution.^[28]

Judicial review and striking downward the police

Afterward ruling that it conflicted with the Constitution, the Court struck downwards Section 13 of the Judiciary Deed in the U.S. Supreme Court'due south commencement ever proclamation of the power of judicial review.^{[viii] [thirty]} The Court ruled that American federal courts have the power to turn down to requite any effect to congressional legislation that is inconsistent with their interpretation of the Constitution—a movement known as "hit down" laws.^[31]

The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly requite the American judiciary the ability of judicial review.^[32] Nevertheless, Marshall's stance gives a number of reasons in support of the judiciary's possession of the ability. Commencement, the Court reasoned that the written nature of the Constitution inherently established judicial review.^{[33] [34]} Borrowing from Alexander Hamilton'southward essay Federalist No. 78, Marshall wrote:

The powers of the legislature are defined and express; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. ... Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them every bit forming the fundamental and paramount police of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an deed of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.

— Marbury, v U.Southward. at 176–77.^[35]

2nd, the Court declared that deciding the constitutionality of the laws information technology applies is an inherent role of the American judiciary's office.^[36] In what has become the near famous and frequently quoted line of the opinion, Marshall wrote:

Information technology is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Section to say what the police force is.

— Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.^[37]

Marshall reasoned that the Constitution places limits on the American regime'south powers, and that those limits would exist meaningless unless they were subject to judicial review and enforcement.^{[34] [36]} He reasoned that the Constitution's provisions limiting Congress's power—such as the export revenue enhancement clause or the prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex mail service facto laws—meant that in some cases judges would be forced to choose betwixt enforcing the Constitution or post-obit Congress.^[38] Marshall held "virtually as a thing of iron logic" that in the event of conflict between the Constitution and statutory laws passed by Congress, the constitutional law must be supreme.^[eight]

Third, the Court said that denying the supremacy of the Constitution over Congress'south acts would mean that "courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see merely the police."^[39] This, Marshall wrote, would brand Congress omnipotent, since none of the laws it passed would ever be invalid.^[34]

This doctrine ... would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, withal the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. Information technology would be giving to the legislature a applied and real omnipotence, with the aforementioned breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits.

— Marbury, 5 U.Due south. at 178.^[40]

Marshall so gave several other reasons in favor of judicial review. He reasoned that the authorization in Article III of the Constitution that the Court can determine cases arising "under this Constitution" unsaid that the Court had the power to strike downwardly laws conflicting with the Constitution.^[36] This, Marshall wrote, meant that the Founders were willing to take the American judiciary employ and interpret the Constitution when judging cases. He also said that federal judges' oaths of part—in which they swear to discharge their duties impartially and "agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the U.s."—requires them to support the Constitution.^[41] Lastly, Marshall reasoned that judicial review is unsaid in the Supremacy Clause of Commodity 6 of the U.S. Constitution, since it declares that the supreme law of the United States is the Constitution and laws made "in Pursuance thereof", rather than the Constitution and all federal laws generally.^{[42] [41]}

Having given his list of reasons, Marshall ended the Court'southward opinion by reaffirming the Courtroom's ruling on the invalidity of Department 13 of the Judiciary Human activity and, therefore, the Courtroom's inability to issue Marbury's writ of mandamus.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, too as other departments, are jump by that instrument. The rule must be discharged.

— Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180.

Analysis

Political dilemma

Principal justice John Marshall, as painted by Henry Inman in 1832, subsequently having presided over the American federal judiciary for over 30 years

As well its legal problems, the example of Marbury five. Madison likewise created a difficult political dilemma for John Marshall and the Supreme Court.^[43] If the Court had ruled in Marbury'southward favor and issued a writ of mandamus ordering Madison to deliver Marbury's commission, Jefferson and Madison would probably take simply ignored it, which would have fabricated the Courtroom wait impotent and emphasized the "shakiness" of the judiciary.^[43] On the other paw, a simple ruling against Marbury would have given Jefferson and the Autonomous-Republicans a clear political victory over the Federalists.^[43] Marshall solved both bug. Start, he had the Court dominion that Madison's withholding of Marbury'southward committee was illegal, which pleased the Federalists. But the stance he wrote also held that the Court could non grant Marbury his requested writ of mandamus, which gave Jefferson and the Autonomous-Republicans the result they desired.

Merely in what the American legal scholar Laurence Tribe calls "an oft-told tale ... [that] remains awe-inspiring", Marshall had the Court rule confronting Marbury in a mode that maneuvered Marbury's simple petition for a writ of mandamus into a example that presented a question that went to the heart of American constitutional constabulary itself.^[44] The American political historian Robert G. McCloskey describes:

[Marbury v. Madison] is a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant case of Marshall's capacity to sidestep danger while seeming to court it. ... The danger of a head-on clash with the Jeffersonians was averted past the denial of jurisdiction: but, at the same time, the declaration that the commission was illegally withheld scotched any impression that the Courtroom condoned the administration'south behavior. These negative maneuvers were artful achievements in their own right. But the bear upon of genius is evident when Marshall, not content with having rescued a bad situation, seizes the occasion to set forth the doctrine of judicial review. It is like shooting fish in a barrel for united states to see in retrospect that the occasion was golden, ... but only a judge of Marshall's discernment could have recognized information technology.^[45]

Marshall had been looking for a case suitable for introducing judicial review and was eager to utilize the situation in Marbury to establish his claim.^[46] He introduced judicial review—a move Jefferson decried—only used information technology to strike down a provision of a constabulary that he read to accept expanded the Supreme Court'south powers, and thereby produced Jefferson'south hoped-for event of Marbury losing his example.^[47] Marshall "seized the occasion to uphold the institution of judicial review, simply he did and then in the form of reaching a judgment that his political opponents could neither defy nor protestation."^[48] Though Jefferson criticized the Courtroom'south decision, he accustomed it, and Marshall'southward opinion in Marbury "clear[d] a office for the federal courts that survives to this day."^[49] The American legal scholar Erwin Chemerinsky concludes: "The brilliance of Marshall's opinion cannot be overstated."^[47]

Legal criticism

Marshall's historic stance in Marbury 5. Madison continues to be the subject of critical assay and inquiry.^[50] In a 1955 Harvard Police force Review article, U.Southward. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter emphasized that one tin criticize Marshall's opinion in Marbury without demeaning it: "The backbone of Marbury v. Madison is not minimized by suggesting that its reasoning is not impeccable and its conclusion, however wise, non inevitable."^[51]

Criticisms of Marshall'southward opinion in Marbury usually fall into two general categories.^[50] Showtime, some criticize the way Marshall "strove" to attain the conclusion that the U.South. Supreme Court has constitutional dominance over the other branches of the U.South. government. Today, American courts more often than not follow the principle of "ramble avoidance": if a sure interpretation of a law raises constitutional problems, they prefer to use culling interpretations that avoid these problems, so long as the alternative interpretations are still plausible.^[52] In Marbury, Marshall could have avoided the constitutional questions through different legal rulings: for case, if he had ruled that Marbury did non have a right to his commission until it was delivered, or if he had ruled that refusals to accolade political appointments could only be remedied through the political procedure and non the judicial process, it would have concluded the instance immediately and the Court would non have reached the instance's constitutional problems.^[53] Marshall did not practice so, and many legal scholars have criticized him for information technology.^[52] Some scholars have responded that the "constitutional avoidance" principle did not be in 1803, and in whatever example is "simply a full general guide for Courtroom action", non an "ironclad rule".^[54] Alternatively, it has also been argued that the claim that Marshall "strove" to create a controversy largely vanishes when the case is viewed from the legal perspective of the late 18th century, when American colonies' and states' supreme courts were largely modeled on England's Court of King's Bench, which inherently possessed mandamus powers.^[55]

2nd, Marshall'due south arguments for the Court's authority are sometimes said to be mere "serial of assertions", rather than substantive reasons logically laid out to back up his position.^[56] Scholars generally agree that Marshall'south series of assertions regarding the U.S. Constitution and the actions of the other branches of government do not "inexorably pb to the conclusion that Marshall draws from them."^[56] Marshall's assertion of the American judiciary'due south say-so to review executive branch actions was the most controversial issue when Marbury was starting time decided, and several subsequent U.S. presidents take tried to dispute information technology, to varying degrees.^[56]

Additionally, it is questionable whether Marshall should have participated in the Marbury case because of his participating part in the dispute.^[14] Marshall was all the same the acting secretarial assistant of land when the nominations were made, and he had signed Marbury and the other men's commissions and had been responsible for their delivery.^[14] This potential conflict of interest raises potent grounds for Marshall to have recused himself from the instance.^[14] In hindsight, the fact that Marshall did not recuse himself from Marbury is likely indicative of his eagerness to hear the case and employ it to found judicial review.^[53]

Legacy

Marbury v. Madison is regarded as the single most of import conclusion in American constitutional law.^[ane] It established U.S. federal judges' authority to review the constitutionality of Congress's legislative acts,^[1] and to this mean solar day the Supreme Court's power to review the constitutionality of American laws at both the federal and state level "is mostly rested upon the epic decision of Marbury v. Madison."^[57]

Although the Courtroom'south opinion in Marbury established judicial review in American federal law, it did not invent or create it. Some 18th-century British jurists had argued that English courts had the power to circumscribe Parliament.^[58] The idea became widely accepted in Colonial America—especially in Marshall's native Virginia—under the rationale that in America only the people were sovereign, rather than the authorities, and and so the courts should only implement legitimate laws.^{[58] [59]} By the fourth dimension of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, American courts' "independent power and duty to interpret the constabulary" was well established,^[60] and Hamilton had defended the concept in Federalist No. 78. Nevertheless, Marshall's opinion in Marbury was the power's commencement proclamation and exercise by the Supreme Courtroom. It fabricated the practice more routine, rather than infrequent, and prepared the mode for the Court's opinion in the 1819 case McCulloch five. Maryland, in which Marshall implied that the Supreme Court was the supreme interpreter of the U.S. Constitution.^[61]

Although it is a strong check on the other branches of the U.S. government, federal courts rarely exercised the power of judicial review in early American history. Later deciding Marbury in 1803, the Supreme Court did not strike down another federal constabulary until 1857, when the Court struck down the Missouri Compromise in its at present-infamous decision Dred Scott v. Sandford, a ruling that contributed to the outbreak of the American Civil State of war.^[62]

See also

• Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth
• Calder v. Bull
• Hylton v. The states
• Martin v. Hunter's Lessee

References

Notes

1. ^ The U.Due south. Constitution originally had new presidents take part in early March, which left a four-month gap between elections the previous November and presidential inaugurations. This inverse in 1933 with the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which moved presidential inaugurations up to Jan xx and thereby reduced the period between elections and inaugurations to about two-and-a-one-half months.
2. ^ In retaliation for Adams's appointment of the "Midnight Judges", Jefferson and the new Democratic-Republican Congressmen passed a bill that canceled the Supreme Court'due south 1802 term. This prevented all its pending cases, including Marbury v. Madison, from being decided until 1803.
3. ^ Due to illnesses, justices William Cushing and Alfred Moore did not sit for oral argument or participate in the Court'southward determination.

Citations

1. ^ ^{a b c d} Chemerinsky (2019), § two.2.1, p. 39.
2. ^ ^{a b} McCloskey (2010), p. 25.
3. ^ ^{a b} Chemerinsky (2019), § two.2.1, pp. 39–xl.
4. ^ ^{a b} Pohlman (2005), p. 21.
5. ^ ^{a b} Chemerinsky (2019), § two.2.1, p. xl.
6. ^ ^{a b} Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.two.1, pp. 41–42.
7. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.2.1, p. 44.
8. ^ ^{a b c d due east} Epstein (2014), p. 89.
9. ^ McCloskey (2010), pp. 23–24.
10. ^ ^{a b c d e} Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.2.1, p. 40.
11. ^ Brest et al. (2018), p. 115.
12. ^ Miller (2009), p. 44.
13. ^ Paulsen et al. (2013), p. 141.
14. ^ ^{a b c d e} Chemerinsky (2019), § two.ii.1, p. 41.
15. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.two.1, p. 41.
16. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § two.2.1, p. 42.
17. ^ Amar (1989), p. 447.
18. ^ Amar (1987), pp. 1485–86.
19. ^ Amar (1987), p. 1486.
20. ^ Brest et al. (2018), pp. 124–25.
21. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § two.2.one, pp. 42–43.
22. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § two.2.1, p. 41, quoting Marbury, 5 U.South. at 163.
23. ^ The Onetime Supreme Court Chamber, 1810–1860 (PDF). Part of Senate Curator (Report). U.S. Senate Committee on Art. 2015-06-24 [2014-02-10]. S. Pub. 113-three.
24. ^ ^{a b} Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.2.i, p. 43.
25. ^ Chemerinsky (2012), pp. iii, ix (quoting U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1).
26. ^ Van Alstyne (1969), p. xv.
27. ^ Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.three, p. 50.
28. ^ ^{a b c} Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, p. 44.
29. ^ Fallon et al. (2015), pp. 69–lxx.
30. ^ Currie (1997), p. 53.
31. ^ Tribe (2000), p. 207.
32. ^ Tribe (2000), pp. 207–08.
33. ^ Prakash & Yoo (2003), p. 914.
34. ^ ^{a b c} Tribe (2000), p. 210.
35. ^ Quoted in function in Chemerinsky (2019), § two.2.i, p. 45, and Tribe (2000), p. 210.
36. ^ ^{a b c} Chemerinsky (2019), § two.ii.i, p. 45.
37. ^ Quoted in Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.ane, p. 45.
38. ^ Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.three, pp. 52–53.
39. ^ Tribe (2000), p. 210, quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
40. ^ Quoted in Tribe (2000), p. 210.
41. ^ ^{a b} Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.3, p. 53.
42. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.two.1, p. 46.
43. ^ ^{a b c} McCloskey (2010), p. 26.
44. ^ Tribe (2000), p. 208, note 5.
45. ^ McCloskey (2010), pp. 25–27.
46. ^ Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.four(a), p. 55.
47. ^ ^{a b} Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, p. 46.
48. ^ Fallon et al. (2015), p. 69.
49. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, pp. 46–47.
50. ^ ^{a b} Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § one.iv(a), p. 54.
51. ^ Frankfurter (1955), p. 219
52. ^ ^{a b} Brest et al. (2018), pp. 133–34.
53. ^ ^{a b} Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § i.4(a), p. 55.
54. ^ Nowak & Rotunda (2012), §ane.4(a), pp. 55–56.
55. ^ Pfander (2001), pp. 1518–19.
56. ^ ^{a b c} Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.4(a), p. 56.
57. ^ Van Alstyne (1969), p. i.
58. ^ ^{a b} Cornell & Leonard (2008), p. 540.
59. ^ Treanor (2005), p. 556.
60. ^ Paulsen (2003), p. 2707.
61. ^ Cornell & Leonard (2008), p. 542.
62. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, p. 47.

Works cited

• Amar, Akhil Reed (1987). "Of Sovereignty and Federalism". Yale Police Periodical. 96 (7): 1425–1520. doi:x.2307/796493. JSTOR 796493.
• Amar, Akhil Reed (1989). "Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtroom". University of Chicago Law Review. 56 (2): 443–99. doi:10.2307/1599844. JSTOR 1599844.
• Brest, Paul; Levinson, Sanford; Balkin, Jack M.; Amar, Akhil Reed; Siegel, Reva B. (2018). Processes of Ramble Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials (seventh ed.). New York: Wolters Kluwer. ISBN978-1-4548-8749-2.
• Chemerinsky, Erwin (2012). Federal Jurisdiction (6th ed.). New York: Wolters Kluwer. ISBN978-1-4548-0402-4.
• Chemerinsky, Erwin (2019). Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (sixth ed.). New York: Wolters Kluwer. ISBN978-1-4548-9574-9.
• Cornell, Saul; Leonard, Gerald (2008). "The Consolidation of the Early Federal System, 1791–1812". In Grossberg, Michael; Tomlins, Christopher (eds.). The Cambridge History of Constabulary in America, Volume I: Early America (1580–1815). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 518–54. ISBN978-0-521-80305-2.
• Currie, David P. (1997). The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789–1801. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN9780226131146.
• Epstein, Richard A. (2014). The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Academy Press. ISBN978-0-674-72489-1.
• Fallon, Richard H., Jr.; Manning, John F.; Meltzer, Daniel J.; Shapiro, David L. (2015). Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (7th ed.). St. Paul, Minnesota: Foundation Press. ISBN978-1-60930-427-0.
• Frankfurter, Felix (1955). "John Marshall and the Judicial Function". Harvard Police Review. 69 (ii): 217–38. doi:x.2307/1337866. JSTOR 1337866.
• McCloskey, Robert G. (2010). The American Supreme Court. Revised by Sanford Levinson (5th ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Printing. ISBN978-0-226-55686-4.
• Miller, Mark Carlton (2009). The View of the Courts from the Hill: Interactions Between Congress and the Federal Judiciary. Charlottesville: Academy of Virginia Press. ISBN9780813928104.
• Nowak, John E.; Rotunda, Ronald D. (2012). Treatise on Constitutional Police force: Substance and Procedure (5th ed.). Eagan, Minnesota: W. OCLC 798148265.
• Paulsen, Michael Stokes (2003). "The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury". Michigan Law Review. 101 (8): 2706–43. doi:10.2307/3595393. JSTOR 3595393.
• Paulsen, Michael Stokes; Calabresi, Steven G.; McConnell, Michael W.; Bray, Samuel (2013). The Constitution of the The states. University Casebook Serial (2d ed.). St. Paul: Foundation Press. ISBN978-1-60930-271-9.
• Pfander, James East. (2001). "Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court'due south Supervisory Powers". Columbia Law Review. 101 (7): 1515–1612. doi:x.2307/1123808. JSTOR 1123808.
• Pohlman, H. L. (2005). Constitutional Debate in Action: Governmental Powers. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN978-0-7425-3593-0.
• Prakash, Saikrishna; Yoo, John (2003). "The Origins of Judicial Review". University of Chicago Law Review. 70 (3): 887–982. doi:10.2307/1600662. JSTOR 1600662.
• Treanor, William Michael (2005). "Judicial Review Before Marbury". Stanford Constabulary Review. 58 (ii): 455–562. JSTOR 40040272.
• Tribe, Laurence H. (2000). American Constitutional Law (tertiary ed.). New York: Foundation Printing. ISBN978-i-56662-714-6.
• Van Alstyne, William (1969). "A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison". Duke Law Periodical. xviii (i): 1–49.

Further reading

• Nelson, William E. (2000). Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review . University Press of Kansas. ISBN978-0-7006-1062-4. (one introduction to the instance)
• Clinton, Robert Lowry (1991). Marbury 5. Madison and Judicial Review. University Press of Kansas. ISBN978-0-7006-0517-0. (Claims that it is a mistake to read the case every bit claiming a judicial power to tell the President or Congress what they can or cannot do under the Constitution.)
• Irons, Peter H. (1999). A People'due south History of the Supreme Courtroom. Penguin Books. pp. 104–107. ISBN978-0-14-029201-v.
• Newmyer, R. Kent (2001). John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Courtroom. Louisiana State University Printing. ISBN978-0-8071-3249-4.
• James Yard. O'Fallon, The Case of Benjamin More than: A Lost Episode in the Struggle over Repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act, xi Police force & Hist. Rev. 43 (1993).
• Tushnet, Marking (2008). I dissent: Nifty Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court Cases. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. 1–sixteen. ISBN978-0-8070-0036-vi.
• Sloan, Cliff; McKean, David (2009). The Corking Decision: Jefferson, Adams, Marshall and the Boxing for the Supreme Courtroom. New York, NY: PublicAffairs. ISBN978-1-58648-426-2.
• Trachtman, Michael Yard. (2016-09-06). The Supremes' Greatest Hits, 2nd Revised & Updated Edition: The 44 Supreme Court Cases That Almost Directly Affect Your Life (Third, Revised ed.). Sterling. ISBN9781454920779.

External links

• Text of Marbury five. Madison, 5 U.Southward. (i Cranch) 137 (1803) is available from:Cornell Findlaw Justia Library of Congress OpenJurist
• Primary Documents in American History: Marbury five. Madison from the Library of Congress
• "John Marshall, Marbury 5. Madison, and Judicial Review—How the Courtroom Became Supreme" Lesson programme for grades 9–12 from National Endowment for the Humanities
• The 200th Anniversary of Marbury 5. Madison: The Reasons We Should Still Intendance About the Decision, and The Lingering Questions It Left Behind
• The Establishment of Judicial Review
• The 200th Anniversary of Marbury 5. Madison: The Supreme Courtroom's Beginning Nifty Instance
• Case Brief for Marbury v. Madison at Lawnix.com
• The short film Marbury v. Madison (1977) is available for gratis download at the Internet Archive.
• "Supreme Courtroom Landmark Case Marbury five. Madison" from C-Span's Landmark Cases: Historic Supreme Courtroom Decisions

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marbury_v._Madison

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